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With over 1,000 migrants in the Mediterranean feared dead following a series of incidents in recent
weeks, EU Foreign and Interior Ministers agreed on an action plan on 20 April for addressing the
crisis. Anna Triandafyllidou writes on the factors underpinning the problem and outlines four key
elements that a new strategic approach should consist of: strengthening the EU’s search and
rescue capabilities, enlisting the support of neighbouring countries, tackling the smuggling networks
active in the region, and reforming the system that assigns responsibility for asylum seekers
between EU states.
While the problem of irregular crossings and the tragic loss of human life witnessed recently is not new in the
Mediterranean, the geopolitical context within which this happens is quite diﬀerent from what it was in 2006 when
the Canary islands crisis took place, with 26,000 arrivals in one year. Since then arrivals along the western
Mediterranean route (via Morocco to Spain) have decreased while the central Mediterranean (via Libya to Italy) and
the eastern Mediterranean routes (via Turkey to Greece) have ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly, with peaks of arrivals in Italy in
2007-08 and peaks in Greece in 2010-12.
The crossings, the associated smuggling businesses, and the overall ﬂight of both economic migrants and asylum
seekers now takes place in a completely diﬀerent context. The map of North Africa has changed: Libya has
collapsed into internal chaos, Egypt has restored authoritarian (secular) rule, Tunisia has democratised, and
Morocco is also gradually democratising. Indeed the latter two countries promise to be the most reliable allies of the
EU in eﬀorts to manage asylum seeking and irregular migration in the Mediterranean.
At the same time, however, several states in the
Middle East have imploded, with Islamic State
controlling parts of Syria and Iraq, creating huge
instability in the region. Islamic State have spread
violence across borders through taped beheadings
and executions of ‘inﬁdels’ of all kinds, as well as of
Muslims who do not align (whether it is the captured
Jordanian ﬁghter pilot or its own followers that smoke
cigarettes or are deemed to have oﬀended the
Prophet).
This new geopolitical context of violence, insecurity
and outright war has huge repercussions for irregular
migration and asylum seeking ﬂows. It generates new
ﬂows of people in search of basic human security. It
also pushes the middle classes of North Africa and
the Middle East out of those countries which have
failed to democratise and transform, while opening up
‘business opportunities’ for both smuggling and
traﬃcking networks. Finally it provides illusory opportunities to cross into Europe for people ﬂeeing poverty and
political instability from countries like Somalia, Eritrea, or Nigeria. The escalation of IS violence and its spreading
through guerrillas or inﬁltrators in Libya, through terrorists in Tunisia, and into other states, further exacerbates these
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The current pressures stemming from both asylum seekers and irregular migrants will not cease any time soon.
There will not be a massive exodus, but the numbers will continue to be sustained. The European Union cannot
manage this situation with the toolkit of the 1990s, notably the Dublin Regulation (that despite reforms remains
pretty much identical to its initial concept drafted in 1990) and the emphasis on returning failed asylum seekers and
apprehended irregular migrants. The approach that is needed is one that is more strategic and multi-faceted.
Irregular migration in the Mediterranean: a four point plan of action
Some commentators have called for a naval blockade of Libya, arguing that this would discourage the smuggling
networks and provide relief to immediately neighbouring countries, notably Italy and Greece, while stopping the
deaths of innocent people. However such an operation would risk transforming Libya in the short run into a quasi-
concentration camp. Until word spread that the route was blocked, people from sub Saharan Africa would continue
to arrive and, with the cost of securing safe passage rising, these individuals would be at risk of being jailed, tortured
or exploited by the smugglers, militias and other groups active in the area.
Instead, the EU needs to work with a combined toolkit. First, it must intensify its search and rescue operations,
chieﬂy by implementing a European ‘Mare Nostrum’ operation before the end of this year. This would need to be on
a larger and more ambitious scale than the current ‘Triton’ operation led by the EU’s external border security agency
Frontex, which has proven to be under staﬀed and under ﬁnanced. Ignoring the situation would not tame the ﬂow of
migrants, but rather simply increase the loss of human life in the Mediterranean (which is now by far the deadliest
sea crossing for migration or asylum seeking worldwide).
Second, in addition to this enhanced search and rescue operation, the EU needs to enrol the support and
cooperation of neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean, notably Egypt and Tunisia, as well as Turkey. It should
also seek to win the support of countries of origin and transit outside of the region, notably in southeast Asia, and
West and East Africa. Development aid as well as technological assistance and training is needed to boost the
border guard capacity and ability to ﬁght organised crime in these countries.
Third, alongside these approaches, there is a need for further sophistication in the ﬁght against organised crime,
notably smuggling networks which usually collide with drug traﬃcking and the underground arms trade. Working
locally in cooperation with transit countries, particularly in Turkey and Syria, to dismantle the operations of the
smuggling networks that make the smuggling business so dynamic and ﬂexible, should be an area of priority.
Last but not least, there is a need for essential reform of the Dublin system. The so called ‘ﬁrst safe country’
principle, under which the state in which an asylum seeker entered the EU is usually responsible for their claim, can
no longer hold. This system only creates returnees and further exacerbates tensions within the EU between the ‘ﬁrst
safe countries’ of arrival in the south, and the ‘safer’ countries in the north, that still nevertheless face signiﬁcant
asylum seeker inﬂows despite the Dublin safeguards. A more eﬃcient system of asylum quotas is required for a
fairer sharing of responsibility that would do justice both to the eﬀorts of the “frontier” states like Italy, Malta, and
Greece, but also to the northern countries that receive the highest number of asylum applications.
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